No “landing at any means” in Smolensk!
A command to go around, i.e. NOT TO LAND, issued at the decision height.
Published: December 29, 2016
In response to continuous disinformation on the disaster of the Polish TU 154M on April 10, 2010, near Smolensk, Russia, in particular frequent repetition of the fundamental falsehood that the pilot acting under pressure from General Andrzej Błasik and President Lech Kaczynski tried to land in Smolensk “at any means,” it must be stressed that such version of events is false because it contradicts direct evidence gathered in the course of the investigation.
According to the CVR transcript report issued on January 16, 2012, by the Sehn Institute of Forensic Research in Krakow (“Sehn Institute”), the Pilot-in-Command (“PIC”) of the Polish TU 154M was well aware of difficult weather conditions in Smolensk. He intended to make one approach to the decision height in order to assess the conditions, and then depart. The following fragments from the CVR transcript prove beyond any doubt that the PIC planned to perform only a decision height approach and go around, i.e. not to land in Smolensk.
At 8:17:47 PIC says: "It is not looking good, the fog came out."
At about 23 minutes before the crash, the crew was already prepared for the possibility that landing might not be possible. A concept of “landing at all means" must be completely ruled out. This is clearly proven by the following subsequent statements:
At 8:18:15.9 Flight Officer (F/O) asks: "and if we will not land, then what?"
PIC responds: "We will go around."
Soon thereafter, PIC informs Director of Diplomatic Protocol that most likely they would not be able to land in Smolensk.
At 8:26:18.9 PIC talked to Director of Protocol:
"Mr. Director, the fog came out, at the moment ... with these conditions, which are currently, we will not be able to sit down. We will try an approach, we'll do one attempt, but probably nothing will come out of it. So, please start thinking now what to do next. "
This is an extremely important conversation because it is a testimony as to the "state of mind" of the PIC at about fifteen minutes before the crash. This statement addressed to the Director of Protocol stands as direct evidence and the most important proof of the intent of the PIC to go around with which he began the approach to the Smolensk airport.
In the evidentiary law of the case law system, this type of a statement that is made simultaneously with the developing situation has the greatest evidentiary value in determining the intent of a person in any investigation. Statements made just before, during, or immediately after the incident under investigation are the most reliable, that is, they have the highest evidentiary value in determining the intent of a person under investigation.
The audio evidence and CVR transcript offer undeniable proof that the PIC left the Director of Protocol with no doubt as to the chances of landing in Smolensk, opting only for the execution of one approach, just to the decision height, in accordance with the regulations, in order to assess weather conditions in the vicinity of the airport.
The behavior of the PIC in conversation with the Director of Protocol provides a proof that the Polish Captain had a good assessment of the situation and displayed a proper level of assertiveness and ability to make decisions, thus behaved contrary to the assessments presented in the Russian report.
In order to counter clear evidence that the PIC intended to go around after making one probing approach, the Russians built a bold but unsubstantiated hypothesis that the Commander of the Air Force General Błasik pressured the PIC to land at all cost. The Russians based their hypothesis on the CVR transcript made in Russia, by Russians, in the Russian language. Yet, the analysis of CVR transcript carried out by the Polish experts from the Sehn Institute categorically ruled out the voice of General Błasik in the cockpit. This finding directly contradicts the pressure theory.
The hypothesis put forward by Russian psychologists that the alleged presence of the Air Force Commander in the cockpit resulted in the emotional pressure exerted on the crew that led to "the conflict of motives" and ultimately caused the PIC to attempt to land at all cost, hence rapidly descend below the decision height into the fog, such hypothesis has not been confirmed by any evidence. The CVR transcript commissioned by the military prosecution from the leading Polish institution dedicated to acoustic research - Jan Sehn Institute of Forensic Research - did not find the voice of General Blasik on the CVR. The experts from the Sehn Institute unequivocally stated that among voices registered by the CVR there was no voice of General Andrzej Błasik. The MAK report also disregards the fact that the military pilots of the Special 36 Regiment of the Polish Air Force were well trained not to yield to any pressure or influence of the passengers, no matter how important.
The pressure hypothesis was extensively fabricated by MAK through omissions, modifications and additions to the CVR transcript prepared by the Russians. In the Russian reading of the CVR, about 2 minutes before the crash, a statement was inserted that became the key evidence of the pressure hypothesis. This statement was to attest to the fact that the pilots were subjected to undue pressure also from the President of Poland Lech Kaczynski. According to the Russian CVR transcript:
At 8:38:00,4 the following words were allegedly spoken in the cockpit: "He will go crazy, if …"
Mainly on the basis of the above statement, the Russians were able to build their pressure hypothesis, which is at the heart of the Russian explanation of the Smolensk crash. According to the Russian MAK report and its carbon copy Polish Miller’s report, the Smolensk crash was caused by psychological pressure exerted on the pilot because he feared a negative reaction from the main passenger, i.e. President Lech Kaczynski, for not landing in Smolensk. This pressure led to the conflict of motives that caused the PIC to make the suicidal decision to land at all means, that is, to dive into the fog without seeing the ground.
This fundamental assumption made by the Russians has been completely refuted because the alleged statement “He will go crazy, if…“, which was the basis of the Russians pressure theory, was never spoken. Indeed, this key evidence simply does not exist! According to the CVR transcript made by the Sehn Institute, such statement is nowhere to be found on the CVR recording. At the time when, according to the Russians, this key statement alluding to the pressure from the President was to be made, a very different statement was made:
At 8:38:03 Navigator says: "say that there is one more mile from the central..."
This was, therefore, only a navigation information, which had nothing to do with the alleged statement presented by the Russians "He will go crazy, if..." At this very moment, the CVR registered only an exchange concerned with technical issues, which had nothing to do with any fear of the reaction of the President.
Two minutes later, the most important and unambiguous command was issued by the PIC. The command to “go around,” that is, the command "not to land," was issued at the decision height of 100 meters. According to CVR transcript by Sehn Institute:
8:40:51.7 Navigator says: “one hundred”
8:40:51.9 PIC says: “go around”
8:40:53 F/O repeats: “go around”
MAK completely misread the command issued by PIC at the decision height, right after the Navigator read the height "100". The Russians translated the command to “go around” as the word "normal." Such a big discrepancy is puzzling because there is no phonetical similarity between these two statements in the Polish language. The experts from the Sehn Institute established beyond any doubt that at 8:40:51.9, the PIC issued a command to “go around,” i.e. to depart. This is the command consistent with the declared earlier intent of PIC to descend only to the decision height, and then depart. Once such a command was issued the crew immediately took steps to go around. The military pilots are extensively trained to comply with this command immediately. It means they must take all steps necessary to stop the descent and depart at once.
In light of the fact that the command to "go around" was issued by the PIC at the decision height, it is clear that the crew attempted to depart, particularly considering that the second pilot clearly confirmed the command to "go around" by repeating it. Therefore, the Russian hypothesis that the Polish pilot was landing “at all means” under pressure from the General and President has not been confirmed by any evidence. Therefore a question must be answered why the Polish crew was unable to safely depart after a proper command to “go around” was issued?
Click on the thumbnails below to view screen dumps from the detectors used to examine the wreckage and seats from the Polish president's plane crash in Smolensk. An "X" denotes the presence of the detected explosive substance and its type. The underlined Polish word "Probka" or "probka" in the screen dump 1 and 2, means "Sample"
Why did they all fly on the same plane?
Synopsis: January 12, 2013, Toronto, Canada. The wife of the late Deputy-Minister of Culture Tomasz Merta: "What I am about to tell you now, are suspicions - and not even my own - but, rather the [suspicions of the] individuals in the inner-circles of the [Polish] military... I heard a statement that was made - but, I am not taking any responsibility for how credible, or not credible it is. [I heard that] had the generals and journalists' not been re-assigned to different aircraft, it wouldn't have been the Tupolev [Tu-154M], but rather the Casa [transport aircraft] that would have been taken out.
Because the Generals were no longer onboard the Casa, there was no reason for it to get airborne. And for this reason it was the Yak[-40] that flew off to Smolensk. This Casa [transport aircraft] was never examined in any way. It was not subject to any examination. Aside from a single note in the deposition given to the military, no one was interested why this aircraft didn't fly [to Smolensk]. Perhaps, this is someones crazy phantasy, but perhaps it isn't.
Some [Polish] military personnel had suggested, that it [the Casa] had to stay behind at the Okecie military [tarmack], so that the explosives could be removed from it - because they were no longer needed [...] I am only repeating what I was told."
"Disarming" Explosives ...
It is worth for us to retrace the entire process of "disarming" the case of explosive substances at the crash site. It all started with the publication of Cezary Gmyz in "Rzeczpospolita" on October 30, 2012, and information that the detectors, which were used by experts in Smolensk (in late September and October) showed traces of TNT and nitroglycerine.
As it turned out, the journalist was also reporting about the indication of Hexogen. The storm broke. The prosecution denied the publication, and ultimately, the editor-in-chief of "Rzeczpospolita," Cezary Gmyz and two other journalists lost their jobs. The entire editorial staff of one of Poland’s most popular weeklies, "Uważam Rze", was also silenced.
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